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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v,

i

Case No.

]

LEON EARL DENNEY,
I

Category No

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Should the Utah Supreme Court exercise its jurisdiction
in granting

a Petition

for Writ

of Certiorari

to

review a

decision of the Utah Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's
denial of the Defendant's Motion to terminate probation nunc pro
tunc following a statutory eighteen-month period?
OPINION BELOW
State v, Penney, slip op. No, 880371-CA (June 14, 1989,
Utah Ct. of App.) is reproduced in the addendum to this brief.
NATURE AND JURISDICTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This brief is filed in opposition to the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari seeking judicial review by the Supreme Court
of the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals referred to above and
included herein in the addendum.

The order of the Utah Court of

Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the Defendant's
Motion to Terminate Probation, Nunc pro Tunc after the expiration
of the statutory eighteen-month period.

The Utah Supreme Court

has jurisdiction to consider the State's petition pursuant to

78-2-2(3)(a) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended and pursuant
to Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The pertinent Constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules that this Court will be required on are:
1.

77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and

as written prior to July 1, 1989, as well as Rules 42 and 43 of
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 18, 1985, Leon Earl Denney plead guilty to
two

Third-Degree

Felony

offenses

of

uttering

a

forged

prescription in the Fifth District Court of Iron County, State of
Utah, with the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Circuit Judge, sitting
as District Judge by appointment presiding.

The Defendant was

then sentenced by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Circuit Judge (at
that time), and sitting by appointment on March 20, 1986. Judge
Eves conducted the sentencing proceeding on March 19 and March
20.

The State claims in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari that

the Defendant requested that he be placed on probation for a
period of three years.

It is true that the Defendant's counsel

submitted to the trial court a list of recommendations entitled
Defense Counsel!s Recommendations.

However, there is no point in

the record where the Defendant himself either acknowledged those
recommendations

by

his

counsel

or

waived

his

right

to

an

eighteen-month period of probation as provided by 77-18-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as written at that time.
2

On April 12,

1988, while the Defendant was on probation, Judge J. Philip Eves,
having been appointed as District Judge for the Fifth Judicial
District Court for Iron County, State of Utah, issued an order to
show cause ordering the Defendant to appear and show cause why
his probation should not be revoked based upon allegations that
the Defendant had violated the probation agreement.

On April 28,

1988, the Defendant requested the Court to issue its order to
terminate his probation, nunc pro tunc, following the expiration
of the eighteen month period of probation provided in 77-18-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

Following a hearing on

May 17, 1988, the Defendant's motion to terminate probation, nunc
pro tunc, was denied, and the Court found the Defendant in
violation of his probation and imposed the original concurrent
sentences

of

zero

to

five

years.

The

Defendant

has

been

incarcerated in the Utah State Prison on that commitment order,
as well as a later conviction, since May 17, 1988.
On June 14, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to termination
probation nunc pro tunc and ordered the trial court to issue such
an order.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The

Defendant-Respondent

takes

exception

to

those

portions of the State's statement of facts wherein the three-year
period of probation is represented as being a term expressly
requested by the Defendant through his counsel.

While it is true

that the defense counsel, Mr. Scott M. Burns, submitted this
3

recommendation, there is no referrence in the record where the
Defendant

either

agreed

to

those

recommendations

himself

or

waived the statutory eighteen month period of probation.

The

remaining

are

facts

as

set

forth

in

the

State's

petition

accurate,
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court should deny a Writ of Certiorari to
review the Court of Appeals decision for the reason that the
Court of Appeals accurately followed the Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah, 1988).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE
STANDARD SET FORTH IN STATE VS. GREEN,
757 P.2D 462 (UTAH 1988).
The Supreme Court, Justice Durham writing the unanimous
opinion of the Court, stated in State v. Green, supra:
In accord with this principle, we reaffirm
that
judges
may
exercise
sentencing
discretion within those limits established by
the legislature; the power to fix sentencing
limits and the power to suspend sentence in
favor of probation are not inherent in the
judiciary but must be authorized by statute.
Similarly, the power to revoke probation
must be
exercised
within
legislatively
established limits.
In reversing the trial court's judgment and instructing
the trial court to grant the Defendant's Motion Nunc pro Tunc
Terminating Probation, the Court of Appeals followed the clear
mandate of State v. Green, supra.

The legislative direction in

limiting probation to an eighteen-month period of time was deemed
4

by the Supreme Court, and later followed by the Court of Appeals,
as a clear exercise of legislative discretion in limiting the
length of time during which a person may be placed on probation.
Just as the legislature has appropriately exercised its function
in limiting that time, it has recently amended that statute to
expand

the

months.

probationary

period

for

felonies

to

thirty-six

(House Bill 314, Laws of Utah 1989, Chapter 226).
From

the

reaction

of

the

Legislature

in the

1989

legislative session, it would seem that the Legislature read
State vs. Green, supra., and determined to extend the period of
probation.

However, this is an appropriate legislative function

and within the province of the Legislature and not within the
province of the court.
The Court of Appeals in its decision in this matter as
well

as

the

Supreme

Court

in

State vs. Green,

supra., has

determined that the eighteen-month limitation of probation was
mandatory

by virtue of the wording

legislative

intent

inherent

in

of the

that

statute

wording.

None

and the
of

the

arguments which the State of Utah has placed before the Court .in
its Petition for Writ of Certiorari have requested this Court to
overrule

State vs. Green,

supra.,

and

it would

appear

that

case is controlling in this matter.
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court sets
forth the standards which may apply in the decision to review an
opinion of the Court of Appeals.

As the writer of this brief

reviews those standards, it is apparent that none of those issues
5

have been raised by the State of Utah in its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.

There is no conflict between panels of the Court of

Appeals on an issue of law nor is the decision by the Court of
Appeals in this matter in conflict with the decision of the
Supreme Court in State vs. Green, supra.

It is not apparent in

this case that the Court of Appeals decision has departed at all
from the accepted or usual course of judicial proceedings, and it
does not appear that the Court of Appeals1 decision in this
matter has considered an important question of State law which
has not been settled by the Supreme Court.

Rather, the Court of

Appeals seems to be directly following State vs. Green, supra.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court of Appeals accurately applied the
reasoning in State v. Green, and because the Court of Appeals has
not taken any action which would justify a review of their
decision under the criteria of Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme

Court,

the

Supreme

Court

should

deny

the

Petition

for Writ of Certiorari.
DATED this 14th day of August, 1089.

JAJffiS L. SHUMATE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

to R. Paul

Van

Dam, Attorney

General, 23 6 State

Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and to Charlene Barlow,
6

Assistant Attorney General, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, this 14th day of August, 1989, first class postage
fully prepaid.
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State of Utah#
Plaintiff and Respondent/

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Case No, 880371-CA
Leon Earl Denney#
Defendant and Appellant.

Fifth District/ Iron County
The Honorable J. Philip Eves
Attorneys:

James L. Shumate/ Cedar City# for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow# Salt Lake City,
for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson# Garff# and Greenwood.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's revocation of his
probation. He claims that his probation term automatically
terminated after eighteen months by operation of 1 law pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp. 1986). We agree
and reverse.
Defendant pleaded guilty/ on September 18/ 1985/ to two
third degree felony charges of uttering a forged prescription
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (1985). On March 20/
1986/ he was sentenced to two indeterminate sentences of zero
to five years at the Utah State Prison. The trial court
suspended the prison term and placed defendant on supervised
probation for a term of three years.
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 was amended in 1985 and 1987. See
1985 Utah Laws ch. 229/ § 1; 1987 Utah Laws ch. 114/ § 1. The
provision defendant relies upon in this appeal is currently
found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1988).

ADDENDUM
I OF 6

Defendant completed the first eighteen months of probation
without incident* However, on March 25, 1988, he was arrested
for violating the terms of his probation by allegedly
committing credit card fraud and for driving under the
influence. On April 12, 1988, the trial court ordered
defendant to appear before the court and show cause why his
probation should not be revoked. Defendant filed a motion to
terminate probation nunc pro tunc. The court denied the
motion, revoked defendant's probation and imposed the original
two consecutive sentences of zero to five years.
Defendant argues on appeal that section 77-18-1(10)(a)
mandated that his probation be terminated after eighteen months
of incident-free probation. The state argues that it is within
the trial court's discretion to sentence defendant to two
consecutive terms of probation and that defendant waived his
right to termination of probation by expressly requesting a
three-year term of probation in lieu of a prison sentence.
Section 77-18-1(10)(a) provided that "[u]pon completion
without violation of 18 months probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated from
sentence, unless the person is earlier terminated by the
court." In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the term "shall" was a strong
legislative mandate that required probation to terminate after
eighteen months. "This strong mandate is not consistent with
the State's position that the eighteen-month term is 'tolled'
when any violation occurs within the period and that there is
no time limit for initiating a revocation action." i£l. at
464. In response to the state's concerns regarding violation
of the public's trust, the court held that "all but technical
violations can be punished on their own merits and the
defendant's past record can be considered at that time." Id.
at 465.
Furthermore, the court held that the power to revoke
probation must be exercised within legislatively established
limits.
[W]e reaffirm that judges may exercise
sentencing discretion within those limits
established by the legislature; the power
to fix sentencing limits and the power to
suspend sentence in favor of probation are
not inherent in the judiciary but must be
authorized by statute.

2

!£. at 464.
At the time this matter arose, section 77-18-1(10)(c)
provided the terms for extending probation.
At any time prior to the termination of
probation the court may, after a hearing
with proper notice, upon its own motion or
the motion of the prosecutor, extend
probation for good cause shown, for one
additional term of 18 months in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases or six months in
class B misdemeanor cases. The reasons
for the extension of the probation period
shall be made a part of the court record.
(Emphasis added.)2 Defendant served eighteen months of
incident-free probation. It was after this term of eighteen
months that the court held a hearing and determined that
defendants probation should be revoked.
After reviewing the record, it appears that the trial
court may have intended to sentence defendant to two
consecutive terms of probation lasting eighteen months each.
At the hearing on the motion to terminate defendant's
probation, held approximately two years after the probation
order went into effect, the court stated "[t]he eighteen months
probation was imposed on each felony to run consecutively."
However, neither the verbal nor the written judgment made
any mention of two consecutive terms. Rather, the order
unequivocally stated: -IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Defendant, Leon Earl Denney, be placed on probation for a
period of three (3) years from and after March 20, 1986."
2.

This section now reads:
At any time prior to the termination of
probation, upon a minimum of five days
notice ana a hearing or upon a waiver of
the notice and hearing by the probationer,
the court may extend probation for an
additional term of 18 months in felony or
class A misdemeanors or six months in
class B misdemeanors if fines or
restitution or both are owing.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(c) (Supp. 1988).

3

An unambiguous order made in a criminal proceeding cannot
be varied by remarks made in a later hearing to coincide with
what the judge may have intended. "Where the language of a
judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect as
it is written . . . .- State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. App. 466, 659
P.2d 918, 923 (1983). It is necessary that sentences be
rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to avoid the
possibility of confusion and injustice. Chase v. State, 479
P.2d 337, 339 (Alaska 1971).
Broad and uniform recognition has been
given to the precept that a sentence
imposed by a court acting in a criminal
case should be definite, unequivocal and
unambiguous, so that both the defendant
and the officials charged with executing
the sentence will be fairly apprised of
the intentions of the court.
Id. (footnote omitted). This principle was first articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Dauaherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926), where the Court held that
M
[s]entences in criminal cases should reveal with fair
certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious
misapprehensions by those who must execute them.M However,
"where the meaning is ambiguous, the pleadings and other
documents of record may be reviewed for purposes of construing
the meaning of the judgment.- Garcia, 659 P.2d at 923.
The order, as written and pronounced, sentenced the
defendant to three years of probation. The judge did not state
in his order that this term of three years was actually two
consecutive terms of eighteen months each.3 Although, the
judge may have intended the terms to run consecutively, we do
not examine his intent where the written order is unequivocal.
Because the term of probation automatically terminated
after eighteen months, we do not reach the merits of the waiver
and estoppel argument.

3. We do not reach the merits of whether the judge may
sentence a defendant to two consecutive terms of probation
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1988).

4

The judgment is reversed with directions to grant the
motion nunc pro tunc terminating probation.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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